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VARIETIES OF DETENTION
AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT*
Joseph G. Cook**
Unique among the prohibitions and protected rights of the first
eight amendments to the Constitution, the fourth amendment contains
no absolutes; its standards are couched in terms of reasonableness., A
product of this innate flexibility has been a number of recent Supreme
Court decisions which have broadened the permissible scope of law
enforcement techniques; 2 while at the same time the unbending language
of other amendments has led the Court to seemingly irresistible
extensions of their substantive protections which have stringently limited
3
the confines of lawful police activity.
Although fourth amendment cases frequently turn on the question
of the legality of an "arrest," that term does not appear in the
Constitution. More accurately, the fourth amendment prohibits unreasonable seizures of the person.' While no doubt this concept covers all
cases of illegal arrest, it may well extend to other circumstances. Thus,
some forms of temporary detention technically may not be arrests and
*

All rights reserved by the author.

Associate Professor of Law, University of Tennessee. A.B., 1961, LL.B., 1964, University
of Alabama; LL.M., 1965, Yale University.
I. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV. See Ford v. United
States, 352 F.2d 927, 932 (D.C. Cir. 1965); United States v. Clark, 289 F. Supp. 610, 618 n.10
(E.D. Pa. 1968).
2. See Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969) (dictum); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
3. The privilege against self-incrimination contained within the fifth amendment has been
extended to cover situations thought clearly outside its limits in prior years. Undoubtedly, the
extension of this privilege has been the most notable of the judicial modifications of constitutional
safeguards appurtenant to criminal trials. See Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The
Casefor Constitutional Changes, 37 U. CIN. L. REv. 671 (1968) for an enlightened discussion by
the noted Second Circuit judge. The sixth amendment right to counsel has also been broadened in
scope, but the extension has been less broad than that of the self-incrimination privilege. See Note,
Criminal Co-defendants and the Sixth Amendment: The Case for Separate Counsel. 58 GEO. L.J.
369 (1969).
4. The amendment protects the right of the people to be "secure in their persons," and this
protection is understood to prevent unreasonable arrests or detentions and to prohibit the issuance
of arrest warrants without probable cause. See the interpolation of the amendment in Henry v.
United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100-02 (1959). See also Kuh, Reflections on New York's "'Stop-andFrisk" Law and Its Claimed Unconstitutionality, 56 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 32, 35 (1965).
**
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traditionally may not have been so labelled; but calling such practices by
another name will not resolve the constitutional issue-the detentions
may still be unreasonable. Therefore, the term "arrest," despite its
simplicity and usefulness in other contexts, has severe limitations for
purposes of constitutional analysis. These limitations were explicitly
acknowledged by the Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio6 where the
common-law power of police to make inquiry and an incidental frisk of
a suspicious individual on a street was challenged.
There is some suggestion in the use of such terms as "stop" and "frisk"
that such police conduct is outside the purview of the Fourth Amendment
because neither action rises to the level of a "search" or "seizure" within
the meaning of the Constitution. We emphatically reject this notion. It is
quite plain that the Fourth Amendment governs "seizures" of the person
which do not eventuate in a trip to the station house and prosecution for
crime-"arrests" in traditional terminology. It must be recognized that
whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom
7
to walk away, he has "seized" that person.
Thus, the focal point of inquiry is not on labels, but rather on the
reasonableness of the particular detention involved.
This article will explore the nature of fourth amendment protection
in regard to seizures of the person. First, attention will be directed to the
particular significance to be given a detention which qualifies as an
arrest. Second, consideration will be given to detentions short of arrest,
whose constitutional justification must lie in the reasonable suspicion
5. Implicit in all attempts to broaden the investigatory power of the police has been an
avoidance of the term arrest; the avoidance seems premised on the belief that this in and of itself
would foreclose the constitutional problem.
One can certainly understand the wish which has fathered this attempted distinction, for
"arrest" is a blunt word, implying stigma and dramatizing the instant at which the liberty of
the citizen is totally subjected to the power of the state. . . . It is no wonder, therefore, that
the authors have attempted to soften the sharp image of their proposed change with a
semantic curtain. They would have us believe that a taking into custody for questioning and
search is not an arrest but something else, as if a change in the descriptive label of a concept
effects a change in the nature of the concept itself. This is Madison Avenue at its best, but it
is hard to see how it advances the cause of legal analysis of this proposal on its merits.
Foote, The Fourth Amendment: Obstacle or Necessity in the Law of Arrest?, 51 J. CRIM. L.C. &
P.S. 402,403 (1960). See also Foote, Safeguards in the Law of Arrest, 52 Nw. U.L. REv. 16, 36-38
(1957) [hereinafter cited as Foote, Safeguards]; LaFave, Detentionfor Investigation by the Police:
An Analysis of Current Practices, 1962 WASH. U.L.Q. 331; Remington, The Law Relating to "On
the Street" Detention. Questioningand Friskingof Suspected Persons and PoliceArrest Privileges
in General, 51 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 386 (1960).
6. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
7. Id. at 16 (footnotes omitted). See also Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 726 (1969).
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aroused in the detaining authority by the surrounding circumstances.
Finally, the outer limits of fourth amendment permissibility will be
explored -situations in which limited detentions may be deemed
reasonable notwithstanding an absence of probable cause sufficient to

justify an arrest or of even a minimal level of suspicion.
I.

WHAT IS AN ARREST?

When the legality of a putative arrest is challenged, normally the
issue raised by the accused is whether there was probable cause for an
arrest.8 Regardless of whether the definition of the term is itself a
constitutional question, determining when or if an arrest occurred may
have constitutional significance in delineating the rights of the accused.
On the one hand, the accused may wish to prove that a sequence of
events did constitute an arrest; for if he is able to do so, and if there was
no probable cause for an arrest at that moment, then his being taken into
custody was illegal. Conversely, the prosecution, by proving that no
arrest occurred, avoids the burden of demonstrating probable cause; it
may justify its actions on the basis of reasonableness. On the other hand,
the accused may wish to prove that no arrest was made, thereby
preventing the prosecution from arguing that a disputed search was valid
as incident to an arrest. 9 In such case, the prosecution may find it
desirable to show that the defendant was in fact arrested. 10
8. The nature of probable cause is not within the scope of the present study. The traditional
definition is expressed in Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964), as follows: "[W]hether at that
moment the facts and circumstances within [the officers'] knowledge and of which they had
reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the
petitioner had committed or was committing an offense."
9. The scope of such a search has recently been severely limited by Chimel v. California, 395
U.S. 752 (1969). When an arrest is made, the officers may search only the person and the area of
immediate access, to ensure against the suspect's having a concealed weapon or his obtaining one.
10. Constitutional issues are frequently interrelated and demand separate appraisal. Here,
extremely difficult questions may arise as to when the accused must be apprised of his rights
pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). It is highly probable that from the point of
time when an arrest occurs the accused is entitled to the Miranda warnings and rights. Quite likely,
however, cases will arise in which an arrest has not occurred, yet the circumstances are such that the
Miranda warnings should be given. Nevertheless, these issues should be considered as separate and
distinct problems. For example, see Gray v. United States, 394 F.2d 96 (9th Cir. 1968), in which the
suspects were questioned for five and a half hours, but the court held that the arrest did not occur
until later. Cf.Brown v. United States, 365 F.2d 976 (D.C. Cir. 1966); United States v. Adams, 289
F. Supp. 838 (D.D.C. 1968); People v. Manis, 268 Cal. App. 2d 653, 74 Cal. Rptr. 423 (1969). See
also United States v. Bird, 293 F. Supp. 1265, 1271-72 (D. Mont. 1968); State v. Miranda, 104
Ariz. 174, -, 450 P.2d 364, 370 (1969); People v. Ellingsen, 258 Cal. App. 2d 535, 65 Cal. Rptr.
744 (1968); State v. Evans, 439 S.W.2d 170 (Mo. 1969); LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the
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The importance of this determination is illustrated by Henry v.
United States.11 There, F.B.I. agents were investigating the theft of an
interstate shipment of whisky from a Chicago terminal. They had
received information "concerning the implication of the defendant
Pierotti with interstate shipments,"' 2 but the nature of this implication
was not disclosed in the record. The agents followed the car in which
defendants Pierotti and Henry were travelling after it left a tavern. The
car was eventually parked in an alley. The agents observed Henry leave
the car and return a few minutes later carrying some cartons which he
placed in the car. When the car departed, the F.B.I. agents were unable
to follow it, but eventually found it parked again in front of the tavern.
Shortly thereafter, the defendants returned to the car and again drove to
the same alley. Henry, just as he had done previously, left the car and
returned in a short while with several cartons. Defendants then drove
away; the agents followed and motioned them to stop. The car was
searched, and the cartons, which bore the name "Admiral" and were
addressed to an out-of-state company, were placed in the agents' car.
The defendants were taken into custody and held for approximately two
hours. During this time, the agents discovered that the cartons contained
stolen radios and formally placed the defendants under arrest.
The Seventh Circuit held that no arrest occurred when the car was
stopped, that when the officers saw the cartons in the car, they then had
probable cause to make an arrest and, consequently, that their detention
of the defendants was valid. 13 When the case came before the Supreme
Court, both the majority and the two dissenters agreed that at the time
the car was stopped there was no probable cause for making an arrest.
Furthermore, all the Justices agreed that sighting the cartons with the
interstate labels did constitute probable cause for an arrest. However,
the issue which divided the Court, and upon which it parted company
with the tribunal below, was determining the moment in which the
arrrest occurred. Justice Douglas, speaking for the Court, stated:
The prosecution conceded below, and adheres to the concession here, that
the arrest took place when the federal agents stopped the car. That is our
Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters and Beyond, 67 MICH. L. REv. 39, 95-114 (1968) [hereinafter
cited as LaFave, Street Encounters].
11. 361 U.S. 98 (1959).
12. Id. at 99.
13. United States v. Henry, 259 F.2d 725 (7th Cir. 1958). One judge dissented, contending
that not only was there a lack of probable cause at the time of the stopping, but also that there was a
lack of probable cause after the agents discovered the cartons in the car. Id. at 730.
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view on the facts of this particular case. When the officers interrupted the
two men and restricted their liberty of movement, the arrest, for purposes
of this case, was complete."
Justice Clark, joined in dissent by Chief Justice Warren, argued that the
stopping of the car did not amount to an arrest, and that the events
15
subsequent to the stopping provided the necessary probable cause.
Henry v. United States is a curious and confusing case. An
examination of the respective briefs of the parties indicates that they
were arguing entirely different points. The defendant argued the issue on
which the Court decided the case-that an arrest occurred at the time the
car was stopped. Conceding that there were no Supreme Court decisions
pertinent to the question, the only authority the defendant could bring to
his support was an Illinois Court of Appeals decision which defined
arrest in terms of restricting the individual's freedom of locomotion. 6
Precedent clearly would have favored the prosecution, had they elected
to contest the issue. 17 But surprisingly, the prosecution conceded that the
arrest had occurred when the automobile was stopped, 8 and chose to
argue instead that there was probable cause for an arrest at that time.
The issue properly before the Supreme Court then was whether
probable cause for an arrest existed at the time the car was stopped. The
two dissenting Justices, however, discounting the fact that the time of the
arrest was not in dispute, argued that the arrest had not occurred until a
time later than that agreed. The majority similarly acknowledged that
the question was moot, yet chose to express its opinion that the arrest
had indeed occurred at the time of the stopping. This was no mere
14. 361 U.S. at 103.
15. [T]he time at which the agents were required to have reasonable grounds to believe
that petitioner was committing a felony was when they began the search of the automobile,
which was after they had seen the cartons with interstate labels in the car. The earlier events
certainly disclosed ample grounds to justify the following of the car, the subsequent stopping
thereof, and the questioning of petitioner by the agents. This interrogation, together with the
sighting of the cartons and the labels, gave the agents indisputable probable cause for the
search and arrest.
361 U.S. at 106. The same approach was used by Justice Burton, concurring, in Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160, 178-79 (1949).
16. People v. Mirbelle, 276 11. App. 533 (1934). The facts in Mirbelle were far more
indicative of the occurrence of an arrest: "The State's evidence shows that police officers, armed
with revolvers, approached defendant, announced that they were officers, and commanded, in effect,
that defendant surrender, whereupon he immediately put up his hands, thereby plainly indicating
that he complied with their command, and submitted to arrest." Id. at 544. See also Legrand v.
Bedinger, 20 Ky. 539 (1827), quoted at length in the Mirbelle decision.
17. See note 28 infra and accompanying text.
18. Brief for the United States at 1, 12, Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959).
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dictum since the Court considered the time of arrest to be determinant of
outcome in the case. Because it was the first time the Court had
addressed itself to that issue, it would seem appropriate to define the
term "arrest." Yet, in the final analysis the majority merely states
perfunctorily that an arrest occurred at the time of the stopping; the
dissent states that it did not and then proceeds to tell when it did occur.
Neither opinion explains the reasoning behind its conclusions.
Moreover, the majority hedges its decision with the qualification that the
arrest was complete "for the purposes of this case."' 9 Also,
unfortunately, neither opinion indicates whether its conclusion was
constitutionally compelled, or was the prevailing common-law view, or
was the law in the jurisdiction in which the case arose. 20 In any event, had
the majority simply accepted the concession of the prosecution, the case
would have been no different from the numerous cases raising the issue
of probable cause. But having at least commented on the merits of the
question, the impression is left that had the prosecution chosen to argue
that the arrest had not occurred at the time the car was stopped, the
Court would still have decided the issue adversely.
The following year, the question of when an arrest takes place arose
again in Rios v. United States.2' In Rios, state officers were cruising in a
neighborhood reputed for narcotics activity. They were not investigating
a particular crime. They observed the defendant get into a taxicab.
Although neither of the officers had seen him previously, they followed
the taxicab for approximately two miles. When it stopped for a traffic
light, the officers got out of their car and approached the cab from
opposite sides.
Examining the chain of events up to this point, it clearly seems that
there was no probable cause for an arrest, and the Court so found. 22
However, the government contended that an arrest had not occurred at
the time the officers approached the car, that they were only engaged in a
''routine investigation" and did not intend to detain the defendant.
When one of the officers identified himself as a policeman, the defendant
became alarmed, attempted to get out of the taxicab, and in the process
dropped a recognizable package of heroin. The defendant then escaped
the grasp of the officers and ran into an alley, but ultimately was
subdued by gunfire.
19. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 103 (1959).
20. The Illinois authority relied upon by the defendant was not referred to in the Court's
opinion.
21. 364 U.S. 253 (1960).
22. Id. at 261-62.
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The initial encounters between the officials and the accused would
appear to be substantially similar in Henry and Rios. In Rios, however,
the Court did not decide that an arrest occurred at the time the officers
approached the car but, rather, remanded the case with instructions to
the lower court to determine when the arrest did occur z The cases might
be distinguished by reference to the intent of the officers at the time of
the encounter. It is reasonable to believe that in Henry the officers fully
expected to make an arrest for possession of stolen liquor when they
approached the car. In Rios, however, the officers were quite likely
"fishing." Ironically, the officers' inferences in Henry proved quite
incorrect while the hunch in Rios paid off.
Henry might be interpreted to mean that any confrontation between
officers and suspect will constitute an arrest. However, if this were the
Court's intention, Rios would have been reversed merely on the
authority of Henry. Rios clearly indicates that the holding in Henry does
not establish an absolute prohibition of temporary detentions, even when
carried out because of a mere suspicion of crime. A few isolated
decisions within the various jurisdictions appear to imply a literal
reading of Henry.24 Generally, however, Henry and Rios have had little
influence on lower courts.
23. On remand, the district court held that an arrest had not occurred when the officers first
approached the vehicle. United States v. Rios, 192 F. Supp. 888 (S.D. Cal. 1961).
24. See Jackson v. United States, 408 F.2d 1165 (8th Cir. 1969); Moran v. United States, 404
F.2d 663 (10th Cir. 1968); United States v. Ruffin, 389 F.2d 76 (7th Cir. 1968); Bailey v. United
States, 389 F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir. 1967); United States v. Wrieole, 379 F.2d 394 (3d Cir. 1967);
United States v. Baxter, 361 F.2d 116 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 834 (1966); United States v.
Nicholas, 319 F.2d 697 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 933 (1963); Plazola v. United States, 291
F.2d 56 (9th Cir. 196 1); State v. Loyd, 92 Idaho 20, 435 P.2d 797 (1967); Dixon v. Shiner, 248 Ind.
66, 163 N.W.2d 481 (Ct. App. 1968); Williams v. State, 248 Ind. 66, 222 N.E.2d 397 (1966), cert.
denied, 388 U.S. 917 (1967) (court split 2-2, and thus affirmed, on same issue which divided the
Supreme Court in Henry-whether the arrest occurred before or after incriminating evidence was
observed); Edwardsen v. State, 231 Md. 332, 190 A.2d 84 (1963); Terry v. State, 252 Miss. 479, 173
So. 2d 889 (1965) (decision appears to extend further than Henry-arrest occurs when officer begins
pursuit for the purpose of making it); State v. Contursi, 44 N.J. 422, 209 A.2d 829 (1965); State v.
Krogness, 238 Ore. 135, 388 P.2d 120 (1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 992 (1964); State v. Mercurio,
96 R.I. 464, 194 A.2d 574 (1963). In a far reaching interpretation the Rhode Island court construed
Henry to hold "that the constitutional standard against an illegal arrest is founded on the common
law. Here the legislature has attempted to abrogate the common-law test and substitute therefore
that which, at common law, constitutes an unwarranted interference with one's liberty." Id. at 468,
194 A.2d at 576; cf. State v. McWeeney, 100 R.I. 405, 216 A.2d 357 (1966). See also Souris, Stop
and Frisk,or Arrest andSearch-The Use and Misuse of Euphemism, 57 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 25 1,
257 (1966): "'Henrymeans to me that police interruption of a citizen's progress and restriction of
his liberty of movement constitutes an arrest within the purview of the fourth amendment's ban
against unreasonable seizures of our citizens' persons, the validity of which must be judged by the
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It would appear that any too literal interpretation of Henry has
been foreclosed by Terry v. Ohio, 25 in which the Supreme Court
distinguished a detention and incidental search from the arrest which
proximately followed. Too, in Peters v. New York,2 6 the Court cited
Rios with approbation, observing that "it is a question of fact precisely
when, in each case, the arrest took place." ' The greater number of state
and lower federal court decisions which have come down since Henry
and Rios likewise do not regard the cases as imposing a blanket
prohibition on limited detentions for investigative purposes. 28 At most,
Henry would seem of continued viability in cases where there is an
unequivocal show of force by an officer or officers, precluding the
possibility that the suspect will not be taken into custody. Orozco v.
Texas29 is illustrative. There, four police officers entered the petitioner's
bedroom in a boarding house at four in the morning, awakened him, and
began questioning him concerning a homicide. One officer testified, and
apparently the Court agreed, that from the moment the petitioner gave
fourth amendment's requirement of probable cause, not by a standard of mere suspicion." This
interpretation, however, would appear to be soundly refuted by Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I (1968),
discussed at text accompanying notes 37-55 infra.
25. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
26. 392 U.S.40 (1968).
27. Id. at 67.
And while there was some inconclusive discussion in the trial court concerning when Officer
Lasky "arrested" Peters, it is clear that the arrest had for purposes of constitutional
justification, already taken place before the search commenced. When the policeman
grabbed Peters by the collar, he abruptly "seized" him and curtailed his freedom of
movement on the basis of probable cause to believe that he was engaged in criminal activity.
Id.
28. See Wartson v. United States, 400 F.2d 25 (9th Cir. 1968); Dupree v. United States, 380
F.2d 233 (8th Cir. 1967); Moore v. United States, 296 F.2d 519 (5th Cir. 1961); Coleman v. United
States, 295 F.2d 555 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (emphasis placed on the fact that in Henry the Supreme
Court held the arrest complete "for purposes of this case," thus not suggesting any general rule);
United States v. Thomas, 250 F. Supp. 771 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) ["If Henry can be read as holding that
every stopping and consequent restriction of freedom of movement is an arrest, then I must candidly
note that the rule of Henry is more 'honour'd in the breach than the observance.' (Hamlet, Act 4,
Scene 1.)"]; State v. Smolen, 4 Conn. Cir. 385, 232 A.2d 339 (1967); Lowe v. State, 191 So. 2d 303
(Fla. Dist. Ct. 1966); People v. Jackson, 98 I11.App. 2d 212, 240 N.E.2d 421 (II. App. Ct. 1968);
Commonwealth v. Lehan, 347 Mass. 197, 196 N.E.2d 840 (1964); State v. Valstad, 282 Minn. 301,
165 N.W.2d 19 (1969); State v. Berry, 450 S.W.2d 212 (Mo. 1970); State v. Hutton, 108 N.H. 279,
235 A.2d 117 (1967); State v. Dilley, 49 N.J. 460, 231 A.2d 353 (1967); People v. Butterfly, 25
N.Y.2d 159, 250 N.E.2d 340, 303 N.Y.S.2d 57 (1969) (on facts virtually identical to Rios, court
reached the same result and remanded the case for determination of when arrest occurred);
Commonwealth v. Hicks, 209 Pa. Super. 1, 223 A.2d 873 (1966); Howard v. Commonwealth, 210
Va. 674, 173 S.E.2d 829 (1970) (distinguishing Henry).
29. 394 U.S. 324 (1969). The issue before the Court was whether petitioner was entitled to the
Miranda warnings prior to interrogation.

Detention and the Fourth Amendment
his name he "was not free to go where he pleased but was 'under
arrest.' "30
II.

"REASONABLE"DETENTIONS

NOT DESIGNATED AS ARREST

The common law recognizes a power to detain individuals for a
reasonable period of time without such detentions being deemed
arrests. 31 Although such detentions do not require probable cause, there
is a minimal requirement of suspicion.32 Similar limited detentions have
also been authorized by statute. The New York stop-and-frisk lawn is
30. 394 U.S. at 325. See also State v. Basford, I Wash. App. 1044, 467 P.2d 352 (1970)
(Orozco distinguished).
31. See Foote, Safeguards, supra note 5; LaFave, Street Encounters,supra note 10, at 42-43;
LaFave, supra note 5; Remington, supra note 5; Stern, Stop and Frisk:An HistoricalAnswer to a
Modern Problem, 58 J. CRIi. L.C. & P.S. 532 (1967).
32. Although circumstances authorizing the temporary detention of a suspect have not
been articulated with precision, the following criteria have been suggested in determining the
legality of the detention: (1) There must be some rational suspicion by the police officer that
some activity out of the ordinary is taking place; (2) There must be some indication to
connect the person under suspicion with the unusual activity; (3) There must be some
suggestion that the activity is related to crime.
People v. Villareal, 262 Cal. App. 2d 438, 445, 68 Cal. Rptr. 610, 614 (1968). See also People v.
Reulman, 62 Cal. 2d 92, 396 P.2d 706, 41 Cal. Rptr. 290 (1964); People v. Lingo, 3 Cal. App. 3d
661, ___ 83 Cal. Rptr. 755, 757 (1970) ("An officer may not, routinely and without any cause
whatsoever, detain every citizen he encounters--even if he has violated some traffic rule - in order
to interrogate him about narcotics or about any other possible offense, and then use the reply to
such questioning as an excuse for a search otherwise unlawful"); People v. Manis, 268 Cal. App. 2d
653, 74 Cal. Rptr. 423 (1969); People v. Henze, 253 Cal. App. 2d 986, 61 Cal. Rptr. 545 (1967);
People v. Anonymous, 48 Misc. 2d 713, 265 N.Y.S.2d 705 (Nassau County Ct. 1965) (officer could
not stop defendant simply because he was "carrying books in Hicksville").
On the other hand, an officer may become too suspicious. See White v. United States, 271 F.2d
829 (D.C. Cir. 1959), where the officer said: "Anyone walking in that area at that time of morning
is involved in some illegal activity. . . practically anyone." See also People v. Moore, 60 Cal. 2d
674,446 P.2d 800, 72 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1968).
33. N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 180-a (MeKinney 1967):
Temporary questioning of persons in public places; search for weapons.
1. A police officer may stop any person abroad in a public place whom he reasonably
suspects is committing, has committed or is about to commit a felony or any of the offenses
specified in section five hundred fifty-two of this chapter, and may demand of him his
name, address and an explanation of his actions.
2. When a police officer has stopped a person for questioning pursuant to this section and
reasonably suspects that he is in danger of life or limb, he may search such person for a
dangerous weapon. If the police officer finds such a weapon or any other thing the possession
of which may constitute a crime, he may take and keep it until the completion of the
questioning, at which time he shall either return it, if lawfully possessed, or arrest such
person.
For further discussion of "stop and frisk" law see Kuh, supra note 4; Ronayne, The Right to
Investigate and New York's "Stop and Frisk" Law, 33 FORDHAM L. REV. 211 (1964); Schwartz,
Stop and Frisk, 58 J. CRM. L.C. & P.S. 433 (1967); Souris, supra note 24.
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the most well-known of these. The Uniform Arrest Act 3' is also
significant, having been adopted by several states.3 Most importantly,
3
the constitutionality of these statutes has been uniformly upheld.. '
THE UNIFORM ARREST AcT § 2 provides:
(1) A peace officer may stop any person abroad whom he has reasonable grounds to
suspect is committing, has committed or is about to commit a crime, and may demand of
him his name, address, business abroad and whither he is going.
(2) Any person so questioned who fails to identify himself or explain his actions to the
satisfaction of the officer may be detained and further questioned and investigated.
(3) The total period of detention provided by this section shall not exceed two hours.
Such detention is not an arrest and shall not be recorded as an arrest in any official record.
At the end of the detention the person so detained shall be released or be arrested and charged
with a crime.
See generally Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. REv. 315, 320-21 (1942).
35. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1902 (1953); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 594:2 (1955) (allows
detention for up to four hours); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 12-7-1 (1956). Similar statutes are found
34.

elsewhere, e.g., Hawaii, Massachusetts, and Missouri.
HAWAH REV. LAWS §§ 708-41 (1968):
On Suspicion. Whenever a crime is committed, and the offenders are unknown, and any
person is found near the place where the crime was committed, either endeavoring to conceal
himself, or endeavoring to escape, or under such other circumstances as to justify a
reasonable suspicion of his being the offender, such person may be arrested without warrant.
MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 41, § 98 (1968):
They (police officers) may examine all persons abroad whom they have reason to suspect of
unlawful design, and may demand of them their business abroad and whither they are going;
. . . Persons so suspected who do not give a satisfactory account of themselves. . . may be
arrested by the police.
The last sentence quoted was held unconstitutional in Alegate v. Commonwealth, 353 Mass. 287,
231 N.E.2d 201 (1967).
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 544.170 (1953) (emphasis added):
All persons arrested and confined.

. .

for any alleged breach of the peace or other criminal

offense, or on suspicion thereof,shall be discharged from said custody within twenty hours
from the time of such arrest.
See also ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 107-14, 108-1.01 (Smith-Hurd 1970); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 215:1 (Supp. 1969).
36. Del. De Salvatore v. State, 52 Del. 550, 163 A.2d 244 (1960). The effect of the De
Salvatore decision appeared to be the nullification of any ground gained by the statute since the

court interpreted the language to require the same standard of probable cause as was required for
an arrest. This impression, however, was erased in Cannon v. State, 53 Del. 284, 168 A.2d 108
(1961), where the court reaffirmed the constitutionality of the statute and drew a clear distinction
between an arrest and a detention under the statute. See also State v. Moore, 55 Del. 356, 187 A.2d
807 (1963); State v. Halko, 55 Del. 1385, 188 A.2d 100 (1962); State v. Scanlon, 84 N.J. Supei.
427, 202 A.2d 448 (Super. Ct. 1964).
Mass. Commonwealth v. Lehan, 347 Mass. 197, 196 N.E.2d 840 (1964). See also
Commonwealth v. Salerno, Mass. -. , 255 N.E.2d 318 (1970); Commonwealth v. Garreffi,
355 Mass. 428, 245 N.E.2d 442 (1969); Commonwealth v. Matthews, 355 Mass. 378, 244 N.E.2d
908 (1969).
N.H. Nelson v. Hancock, 239 F. Supp. 857 (D.N.H. 1965), rev'd, 363 F.2d 249 (ist Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 386 U.S. 984 (1967). The district court implicitly assumed the validity of the statute
and held for the petitioner on the failure of the state to comply with its provisions. On appeal, the
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The constitutionality of the common-law power to detain and carry
out an incidental frisk was considered for the first time by the Supreme
Court in Terry v. Ohio.3 7 A plainclothesman was patrolling an area
of downtown Cleveland in the early afternoon when his attention was
attracted by Terry and another man.38 He observed them walk back
and forth before a store window perhaps a dozen times. At one point he

observed them confer briefly with a third party who thereafter left.
Finally, the two men walked away together and again met the third party
at another location. The officer, suspecting the men were planning a
robbery, approached them, identified himself, and asked for their names.
When the men "mumbled something," the officer grabbed Terry, placed
him between himself and the other two suspects, and patted down the
outside of his clothing. During this process, he discovered a pistol in
Terry's inside overcoat pocket. Being unable to retrieve the weapon, he
removed Terry's overcoat and gained possession of a .38 caliber
revolver. Terry was subsequently convicted of carrying a concealed
weapon. The conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals of Ohio, 3

and the Supreme Court of Ohio dismissed an ensuing appeal. Thereafter,
the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction in an eight-to-one
40
decision with the majority opinion written by Chief Justice Warren.
Prior to reaching the merits of the case, the Court engaged in a
philosophical discussion of the application of the fourth amendment to
temporary detentions. 4' The Court firmly asserted that detentions on the
decision was reversed on the grounds that the violation of the statute did not violate a constitutional
right, and that there was no seizure of evidence until after a legal arrest.
R.L Kavanagh v. Stenhouse, 93 R.I. 252, 174 A.2d 560 (1961). The United States Supreme
Court dismissed an appeal "for want of a substantial federal question." 368 U.S. 516 (1962).
Justice Douglas felt the case should be heard on its merits before the jurisdictional question was
answered. But see Barth v. Flad, 99 R.I. 446, 208 A.2d 533 (1965), and Berberian v. Smith, 99 R.I.
198, 206 A.2d 531 (1965). In both of these instances, what police contended was a legal detention
pursuant to the statute was interpreted by the court to be an illegal arrest. See also State v. Brown,
.
R.I. -, 260 A.2d 716 (1970).
37. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
38. The officer, who had thirty-nine years experience in police work, could not explain exactly
why they caught his attention. "He explained that he had developed routine habits of observation
over the years and that he would 'stand and watch people or walk and watch people at many
intervals of the day.' He added: 'Now, in this case when I looked over they didn't look right to me at
the time.'" Id. at 5.
39. State v. Terry, 5 Ohio App, 2d 122, 214 N.E.2d 114 (1966).
40. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.'I (1968). Justices Harlan and White wrote concurring opinions;
Justice Black concurred in the opinion of the majority with two minor qualifications; and Justice
Douglas dissented.
41. The Court noted that the Supreme Court of Ohio had dismissed an appeal by the
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street are not distinguishable from invasions of the home,42 because "the
Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. '4 3 The question, then,
was not whether temporary detentions raise a constitutional issue, but
whether such detentions can satisfy the reasonableness standard of the
fourth amendment.
The opinion went on to say that encounters by the police with
individuals are known to occur for numerous reasons, many of which are
unconnected with the ultimate objective of the prosecution of crime.44
"Doubtless some police 'field-interrogation' conduct violates the fourth
amendment,"4 5 but a refusal of the Court to condone such activity would

not prevent abusive practices.46 As Warren saw it the narrow question in
this case was "whether it is always unreasonable for a policeman to seize
a person and subject him to a limited search for weapons unless there is

probable cause for an arrest.

'47

Referring to an encounter between police and individual as a
"stopping" or a "detention" instead of an arrest does not alter the
nature of the constitutional issue.4 8 Nor, per the majority, is it adequate
to say that momentary detentions are too insignificant to raise
constitutional questions. 49 "We therefore reject the notion that the
defendants "on the ground that 'no substantial constitutional question' was involved." 392 U.S. at
8.
42. "This inestimable right of personal security belongs as much to the citizen on the streets
of our cities as to the homeowner closeted in his study to dispose of his secret affairs." Id. at 8, 9.
43. Id. at 9, quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
44. This sort of police conduct may, for example, be designed simply to help an
intoxicated person find his way home, with no intention of arresting him unless he becomes
obstreperous. Or the police may be seeking to mediate a domestic quarrel which threatens to
erupt into violence. They may accost a woman in an area known for prostitution as part of a
harassment campaign designed to drive prostitutes away without the considerable difficulty
involved in prosecuting them. Or they may be conducting a dragnet search of all teenagers in
a particular section of the city for weapons because they have heard rumors of an impending
gang fight.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13, 14 n.9 (1968).
45. Id. at 13, 14.
46. [A] stern refusal by this Court to condone such activity does not necessarily render it
responsive to the exclusionary rule. Regardless of how effective the rule may be where
obtaining convictions is an important objective of the police, it is powerless to deter
invasions of constitutionally guaranteed rights where the police either have'no interest in
prosecuting or are willing to forego successful prosecution in the interest of serving some
other goal.
Id. at 14.
47. Id. at 15.
48. See note 5 supra and accompanying text. See also Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721,726
(1969).
49. 392 U.S. at 19; cf. Kavanagh v. Stenhouse, 93 R.I. 252, 256, 174 A.2d 560, 563 (1961),
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Fourth Amendment does not come into play at all as a limitation upon
police conduct if the officers stop short of something called a 'technical
arrest' or a 'full-blown search.' ''50
Therefore, since the case is to be approached in traditional fourth
amendment conceptualizations, the ultimate question remains whether

there is probable cause-not for an arrest-but for a detention. 51 The
Court formulated its test as follows: "[W]ould the facts available to the
officer at the moment of the seizure or the search 'warrant a man of
reasonable caution in the belief' that the action taken was appropriate?"'52 The language quoted by the Court is that repeatedly employed
in decisions applying the test of probable cause to arrests and searches.
The quotation is cut short, and the phrase, "that the action taken was
appropriate," is added as a means of adopting this extant constitutional
standard to the problem of detentions and frisks short of arrests and
searches.
Effective law enforcement requires questioning of suspects and
informers in situations where probable cause for arrest does not exist.
The practical necessity of such endeavors is a persuasive reason for

concluding that they are not "unreasonable" within the context of the
fourth amendment.0 This consideration has a bearing on application of
appeal dismissed, 368 U.S. 516 (1962): "[l]t seems to us that the general assembly exercised its
police power on behalf of the individual member of society by protecting him against the ignominy
or humiliation of a premature arrest where the detaining officer may have had reason to suspect that
the person detained was guilty of wrongdoing."
Arguably, the suspect could honestly say that he had never been arrested, and there would be no
record of his detention. See People v. Morales, 22 N.Y.2d 55, 63, 238 N.E.2d 307, 313, 290
N.Y.S.2d 898, 906 (1968):
This prerogative of police officers to detain persons for questioning is not only essential to
effective criminal investigation, but it also protects those who are able to exculpate
themselves from being arrested and having formal charges made against them before their
explanations are considered .... The fact that the detention is not recorded as an arrest and
may not be considered by the individual as an arrest is also important.
See also United States v. Rundle, 282 F. Supp. 926 (E.D. Pa. 1968); United States v. Rundle, 274 F.
Supp. 364 (E.D. Pa. 1967); Cannon v. State, 53 Del. 284, 168 A.2d 108 (1961).
50. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968).
51. See id. n. 16: "We thus decide nothing today concerning the constitutional propriety of an
investigative 'seizure' upon less than probable cause for purposes of 'detention' and/or
interrogation." Cf. People v. Excollias, 264 Cal. App. 2d 16, 22, 70 Cal. Rptr. 65, 68-69 (1968)
(Kaus, J., concurring). "Having, both as reader and writer, struggled through dozens of cases
which involve the fine distinctions between probable cause and 'circumstances short' thereof, I
confess that I find the notion of a third concept, sandwiched somewhere between the other two, quite
appalling." See also LaFave, Street Encounters,supra note 10, at 65.

52. 392 U.S. at 21-22.
53. See Goldsmith v. United States, 277 F.2d 335, 344 (D.C. Cir. 1960) ("absurd to suggest

Alabama Law Review

[Vol. 23:287

the Constitutional standard. 54 The Court concluded that the

55
circumstances present in Terry justified an investigation.
Although the impact of Terry is only beginning to be felt, recent
indications are that it has strengthened the hand of lower courts in
upholding the validity of brief detentions which might have caused
considerable "constitutional jitters"'" under prior decisions, particularly
Henry. For example, in Ballou v. Massachusetts,5 7 officers received a tip
from an anonymous informant that the petitioner and others were in a
certain cafe and that they were armed. The officers knew that the
petitioner previously had been convicted of illegal possession of a gun
and that one of his companions was the leader of a faction currently
involved in a gang war. The officers found petitioner and his companion
in front of the cafe, frisked them, and found a revolver in the petitioner's
belt, for the possession of which he was convicted. While acknowledging
that this case did not involve the "unusual conduct" found in Terry, the
First Circuit believed that the detention and frisk were nevertheless
58
justified .

that police must arrest a person before they can ask him questions"); United States v. Bonanno, 180
F. Supp. 71, 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) ("cannot be contended. . . every detention. . . a 'seizure'....
Under such a theory, a policeman could not stop and question a person standing next to a bloody
corpse"); Commonwealth v. Lehan, 347 Mass. 197, 204, 196 N.E.2d 840, 845 (1964) ("[i]ndividual
who acts in a suspicious way invites threshold investigations.
... -not unreasonable for police
to inquire into suspicious behavior during nighttime); People v. Estrialgo, 37 Misc. 2d 264, 282, 233
N.Y.S.2d 558, 576 (Sup. Ct. 1962), rev'd, 19 App. Div. 2d 509, 245 N.Y.S.2d 850 (1963), afjd, 14
N.Y.2d 733, 199 N.E.2d 384,250 N.Y.S.2d 293 (1964)("Police. . . not required to have abnormal
eyesight . . . . They may approach a suspect, observe him and his possessions at close range and
conduct a brief and perfunctory interrogation and investigation"). But see Inbar &Thompson, Stop
and Frisk: The Power and the Obligation of the Police, 59 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 333 (1968) (Terry
makes it "unmistakably clear that the Court will not tolerate dragnet seizures and frisks" even
though for "worthy objectives" if such actions do not meet fourth amendment reasonableness
requirement); Reich, Police Questioning of Law Abiding Citizens, 75 YALE L.J. 1161 (1966). See
also LAFAvE, ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY, chs. 14-16 (1965);
Barrett, PersonalRights, Property Rights, and the FourthAmendment, 1960 Sup. CT. REV. 46, 58;
Leagre, The Fourth Amendment and the Law of Arrest, 54 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 393 (1963);
Warner, supra note 34.
54. "One general interest is of course that of effective crime prevention and detection; it is this
interest which underlies the recognition that a police officer may in appropriate circumstances and
in an appropriate manner approach a person for purposes of investigating possibly criminal
behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22
(1968).
55. "It would have been poor police work indeed for an officer of 30 years' experience in the
detection of thievery from stores in this same neighborhood to have failed to investigate this
behavior further." Id. at 23.
56. Commonwealth v. Howell, 213 Pa. Super. 33, _,245
A.2d 680, 681 (1968).
57. 403 F.2d 982 (Ist Cir. 1968).
58. "[lI]t seems clear to us that the tip in the light of the visual corroboration and the reality
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A similar lack of outwardly suspicious circumstances was present in
the recent California case of People v. Cruppi5 9 Officers observed the
defendant cross the street at a traffic light in front of their patrol car at
5:15 in the morning. Except for the hour, there would appear to be
nothing particularly suspicious in the defendant's behavior.6 0 The
officers pulled alongside the defendant, attracted his attention, and
asked for identification. The defendant showed them his selective service
card."' The address on the card indicated he lived three blocks from the
point of encounter. The defendant told the officers that he had been at an
all night restaurant and said that he wanted to look at the nearby school
grounds before returning home. His reason for doing so was never made
clear. One of the officers then radioed for a "name check" and learned
that there were two warrants outstanding for the defendant's arrest. He
was then placed under arrest. An inventory of his possessions revealed a
quantity of marijuana which in turn led to his being prosecuted. The
court held that the circumstances were suspicious enough to justify the
detaining and questioning of the defendant. Moreover, the
unsatisfactory nature of his responses to the officers' inquiries was found
to be adequate grounds for pursuing the investigation until probable
cause for arrest was established.
The fact that an individual is carrying an object in an unnatural
manner has also been recognized as a significant factor in determining
the reasonableness of a temporary detention. In Commonwealth v.
Howell, 2 an officer observed the defendant wearing one top coat and
carrying another over his arm, apparently in an attempt to conceal
something. When stopped, the defendant told the officer he was carrying
a tape recorder. The officer then asked for some identification,
whereupon the defendant handed him a driver's license describing a
white male, forty-seven years of age. The defendant was a Negro and
4ppeared much younger.6 He was then taken into custody. When the
officer and defendant arrived at the police station, the true owner of the
of a gangland feud were at least the equivalent of the parading by the store window observed in
Terry." Id. at 985.
59. 265 Cal. App. 2d 9,71 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1968).
60. At one point the court indicated that the officers "saw the defendant step from behind a
telephone pole," but his subsequent conduct in crossing the street directly in front of the patrol car
would appear to rebut any air of furtiveness. Id. at 10, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 43.
61. Apparently the court felt the defendant's lack of a driver's license a sign of suspicion in
itself, a somewhat curious presumption to be placed on nondrivers.
62. 213 Pa. Super. 33, 245 A.2d 680 (1968).
63. It was subsequently learned that he was thirty-five years of age.
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driver's license, the top coat, and the tape recorder was at the station
reporting their theft. The court held that the circumstances were suspicious enough to justify the stopping, and that the patently false identification warranted taking the defendant into custody. Similarly, in
People v. Manis,64 an officer observed the defendant during a heavy
rainstorm without a raincoat carrying what appeared to be a new portable typewriter case in a part of town which had been rife with typewriter
burglaries. Officers followed the defendant who went in the direction of
an area where a number of pawnshops were located. At one point they
passed him in their patrol car, whereupon he reversed his direction.
Thereafter, the defendant was stopped, and when asked what he had in
the case, responded that it contained radios which he had stolen. The
court held that the detention was reasonable.
These decisions would appear to indicate an increased judicial
tolerance for the preliminary investigation of behavior only minimally
suspicious but of particular significance to a trained law enforcement
officer. The factors which possess the most significance are dress,
conduct, and movement. 5 These in turn are considered in light of the
setting of time and plac&6.6 Viewing these factors in combination,
preliminary investigation may be warranted if the activity runs contrary
to ordifiary habits and smacks of potential criminal involvement.
A question of considerable constitutional significance not resolved
by Terry is whether an officer can forcibly detain a suspect who ignores
the officer's request to stop. Justices Harlan and White in concurring
opinions in Terry unequivocally indicate that the officer possesses such
authority. 7 If their contentions are correct, then it would appear that
when an officer exercises this power, the individual has been effectively
64. 268 Cal. App. 2d 653, 74 Cal. Rptr. 423 (1969).
65. Id. at 660, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 428.
66. Id.
67. Justice Harlan, feeling "constrained to fill in a few gaps," 392 U.S. at 31, observed:
[1]f the frisk is justified in order to protect the officer during an encounter with a citizen, the
officer must first have constitutional grounds to insist on an encounter to make a forcible
stop . . . . That right must be more than the liberty (. . . possessed by every citizen) to
address questions to other persons, for ordinarily the persons addressed has an equal right to
ignore his interrogator and walk away; he certainly need not submit to a frisk for the
questioner's protection. I would make it perfectly clear that the right to frisk in this case
depends upon the reasonableness of a forcible stop to investigate a suspected crime.
392 U.S. at 32-33. Justice White noted: "[lit seems to me the person may be briefly detained against
his will while pertinent questions are directed to him." 295 U.S. at 34. Cf. Raphael, "Stop and
Frisk" in a Nutshell: Some Last Editorial Thrusts and ParriesBefore It All Becomes History, 20
ALA. L. REv. 294, 301 (1968).
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arrested. Arguably, the evasiveness of the suspect added to the officer's
original suspicion establishes probable cause for arrest.6 s The practical
result of this reasoning is that where suspicious circumstances exist, the
individual must either voluntarily stop or place himself in jeopardy of
being arrested.6 9 An even greater constitutional dilemma may be
presented when the suspect does stop on request, but refuses to respond
to the officer's inquiries. Again, such conduct could tend to confirm the
officer's suspicions. But here, the authority to detain confronts the
absolute "right to remain silent" guarantee of the fifth amendment.7" If
the exercise of this fifth amendment right may be considered in
determining the existence of probable cause, it may be contended that
the suspect has been improperly penalized for invoking a constitutional
7
protection. '

On the same day Terry was decided, the Court also handed down
decisions in the companion cases of Sibron v. New York and Peters v.
New York, 72 both involving the application of the New York stop-andfrisk law. 73 In each instance the central issue before the Court was the
admissibility of evidence obtained in an alleged frisk. The Court was not
called upon to consider the constitutionality of the statutory authority to
"stop"-thus it was able to refrain from intimating an opinion upon
this basic issue. 74 Restricting its attention to the application of the
68. The cases are not in agreement as to the inferences to be drawn from the reaction of the
suspect to the approach of the police. See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963);
United States v. Nicholas, 319 F.2d 697, 698 (lst Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 933 (1963);
People v. Privett, 55 Cal. 2d 698, 361 P.2d 602, 12 Cal. Rptr. 874 (1961); People v. Gaines, 265 Cal.
App. 2d 730, 71 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1968); Gallegos v. People, 157 Colo. 173, 401 P.2d 613 (1965);
Wright v. United States, 242 A.2d 833 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968); People v. Jackson, 98 I11.
App. 2d 238,
240 N.E.2d 421 (1968); Thompson v. State, 4 Md. App. 31, 35, 240 A.2d 780,784 (Ct. Spec. App.
1968); People v. Bomboy, 32 Misc. 2d 1002, 229 N.Y.S.2d 323 (Ct. Spec. Sess. 1962); People v.
Tinston, 6 Misc. 2d 485, 163 N.Y.S.2d 554 (Magis. Ct. 1967).
69. Such potential results add some persuasiveness to Justice Douglas' argument in his
dissent in Terry that the decision has significantly diminished the protection of the fourth
amendment. 392 U.S. at 35-39.
70. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,468 (1966). In this regard, Justice White contended in
Terry, "Of course, the person stopped is not obliged to answer, answers may not be compelled, and
refusal to answer furnishes no basis for an arrest, although it may alert the officer to the need for
continued observation." 392 U.S. at 34. See Raphael, supra note 67, at 302-03. See also
Commonwealth v. Berrios, 437 Pa. 338, 263 A.2d 342, 343 n.2 (1970).
71. See. e.g., Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
72. 392 U.S. 40 (1968)(both cases are treated in the same opinion).
73. See note 33 supra.
74. "[A] pronouncement by this Court upon the abstract validity of § 180-a's 'stop'
category would be most inappropriate in these cases, since we have concluded that neither of them
presents the question of the validity of a seizure of the person for purposes of interrogation upon less
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statute in these cases, the Court concluded that in Sibron the purported
frisk was actually an illegal search and reversed, but that in Peters there
was probable cause to make an arrest, and thus the potential scope of the
statute-conferred authority to detain and frisk was inconsequential.
Consequently, Peters' conviction was affirmed. 75 So long as the stopand-frisk law is used to confer no greater power upon the police than that
approved in Terry, the statute certainly will not be deemed constitu76
tionally offensive.
The relevance of the common-law power to stop-and-frisk was
illustrated in People v. Rivera,77 decided by the Court of Appeals of New
York. Rivera was decided after the passage of the stop-and-frisk law but
concerned facts which occurred prior to the enactment. Therefore, the
new statute was not applied. The court, in sustaining the summary power
of the police to stop-and-frisk on suspicion, 78 stated:
[T]he evidence needed to make the inquiry is not of the same degree or
conclusiveness as that required for an arrest. The stopping of the
individual to inquire is not an arrest and the ground upon which the police
than probable cause." 392 U.S. at 60 n.20. The Court suggested that the constitutional validity of
the statute might well turn on the manner in which it is interpreted by the New York state courts.
"We cannot tell, for example, whether the officer's power to 'demand' of a person an 'explanation
of his actions' contemplates either an obligation on the part of the citizen to answer or some
additional power on the part of the officer in the event of a refusal to answer, or even whether the
interrogation following the 'stop' is 'custodial.' " Id.
75. Eight of the justices agreed with the decisions in both cases. Justice Black preferred to
affirm both convictions. Concurring opinions were authored by Justices White, Fortas, Harlan, and
Douglas.
76. Justice Harlan noted in a concurring opinion:
I would accept, as an adequate general formula, the New York requirement that the officer
must "reasonably suspect" that the person he stops "is committing, has committed or is
about to commit a felony...." "On its face," this requirement is, if anything, more
stringent than the requirement stated by the Court in Terry: "where a police officer observes
unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that
criminal activity may be afoot.
392 U.S. at 72 (citations omitted).
77. 14 N.Y.2d 441, 201 N.E.2d 32, 252 N.Y.S.2d 458 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 978
(1965).
78. The suspicious circumstances were described by the court as follows:
[T]he facts developed in the record, e.g., the incidence of crime in the neighborhood, the
peculiar approaches of defendant and his companion to the grill, the rapid leaving when
police were seen (even in plain clothes three men in a car watching could reasonably give
alarm to a person alert to detection), all justified the police stopping defendant and
questioning him.
14 N.Y.2d at 445, 201 N.E.2d at 34-35, 252 N.Y.S.2d at 462. Rivera was followed in People v.
Pugach, 15 N.Y.2d 65, 204 N.E.2d 176, 255 N.Y.S.2d 833 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 936
(1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 20 (1965), appealdismissed, 383 U.S. 575 (1966).
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may make the inquiry may be less incriminating than the ground for an
7
arrest for a crime known to have been committed. '

Not until two years later did the New York court hear its first case
calling for application of the statute. The case was People v. Peters,80
and, not surprisingly, the court upheld the validity of the statute under
the rationale of Rivera.81 As constitutional authority the court cited Ker
2
v. California,1
where the nation's highest Court had said:
The States are not . . . precluded from developing workable rules
governing arrests, searches and seizures to meet "the practical demands of

effective criminal investigation and law enforcement" in the States,
provided that those rules do not violate the constitutional proscription of
unreasonable searches and seizures and the concomitant command that

evidence so seized is inadmissible against one who has standing to
complain. s3
This passage from the Ker decision has been particularly popular in the
state courts for the purpose of upholding state laws and procedures. The
statement, however, is no more than a tautology: it says only that the
states may employ any law enforcement devices so long as they are not
unconstitutional. 4 We are no closer to precisely determining the
79. 14 N.Y.2d at 445, 201 N.E.2d at 34, 252 N.Y.S.2d at 461. This case is illustrative of the
potential snowballing effect of the power: The police observed the men acting suspiciously and thus
were justified in stopping them. Having stopped the suspects, the frisk was "a reasonable and
constitutionally permissible precaution." The frisk revealed "a hard object" which turned out to be
a .22 caliber gun. The defendant was then arrested for illegal possession of the pistol. The seizure of
the pistol thus became legal as incident to the arrest.
Judge Fuld dissented, conceding the right of the police to stop and question, but contending
that the frisk was an illegal search and seizure prohibited by the fourth amendment. See also Judge
Van Voorhis' dissent in People v. Sibron, 18 N.Y.2d 603, 219 N.E.2d 196, 273 N.Y.S.2d 374 (1966),
rev'd, 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
80. 18 N.Y.2d 238, 219 N.E.2d 595, 273 N.Y.S.2d 217 (1966), affd, 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
81. "[lI]t is apparent that there is not a great deal of difference between the statute and the
standards used in Rivera." 18 N.Y.2d at 244, 219 N.E.2d at 598, 273 N.Y.S.2d at 222. See also
United States v. Thomas, 250 F. Supp. 771 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
82. 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
83. Id. at 34.
84. The language preceding the quotation from Ker is generally ignored:
Findings of reasonableness, of course, are respected only insofar as consistent with federal
constitutional guarantees. As we have stated above, and in other cases involving federal
constitutional rights, findings of state courts are by no means insulated against examination
here . . . . While the Court does not sit as in nisi prius to appraise contradictory factual
questions, it will, where necessary to the determination of constitutional rights, make an
independent examination of the facts, the findings, and the record so that it can determine for
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constitutional standard after Ker than before, because the ultimate
question remains: What is "reasonable" within the framework of the

fourth amendment?"
While both the common-law and the stop-and-frisk statute permit
only a brief detention at the point of encounter, the Uniform Arrest Act
allows a two hour detention in the event the detained party fails to
identify himself or explain his actions to the satisfaction of the detaining
officer. It is only at the end of this period that the individual must be
released unless there is probable cause for his arrest." Granting the
likelihood of the constitutionality of statutory authorization for
reasonable field interrogation in light of the Terry and Sibron decisions,
it would seem probable that a two hour detention, quite likely at the
police station, would be such a restriction on the liberty of movement of
itself whether in the decision as to reasonableness the fundamental-i.e.,
constitutional-criteria established by this Court have been respected.
Id. at 33-34. See also City of Portland v. James, 251 Ore. 8, 11,444 P.2d 554, 557 (1968)in which
the court declared:
The requirement of probable cause is imposed in order to limit police interference with the
citizen's constitutional rights. Neither the legislative assembly nor the city council has the
power to circumvent this safeguard by casting legislation in a form which makes conduct
which creates only suspicion a crime. To say that an officer may arrest if he has probable
cause to believe that the suspect's conduct is suspicious is to speak in anomalies.
See generally Nelson v. Hancock, 239 F. Supp. 857, 868 (D.N.H. 1965).
85. "The adjective 'unreasonable,' chameleon-like, adopts coloration from its surroundings." Kuh, supra note 4. For a discussion of various possibilities in determining the reasonableness
of a detention see Leagre, supra note 53.
86. See State v. De Koenigswarter, 54 Del. 388, 177 A.2d 344 (1962). In one curious
Delaware decision, the defendant contended that he had been held in excess of two hours, and
consequently that a statement obtained during the illegal detention was inadmissible. The court held
that § 1902 was irrelevant because the defendant was not "abroad" when taken into custody. Thus
he had been arrested, not detained. The court ignored the fact that if there had been an arrest, it had
been made without probable cause, a point which apparently the defendant did not argue. Jarvis v.
Del. , 224 A.2d 596 (1966).
State, An alternative method commonly used by police is to arrest an individual on a charge of
vagrancy, a crime of extremely nebulous standards, where the individual is suspected of a more
serious offense. This practice has come under increasing criticism in recent years. See Worthy v.
United States, 409 F.2d 1105 (D.C. Cir. 1968); McNeilly v. State, 119 N.J.L. 237, 195 A. 725 (Sup.
Ct. 1937) (involving a thief looking for a suitable store window to break); State v. Hall, 25 N.J. 381,
52 A.2d 845 (Ct. Spec. Sess. 1947) (prostitute with a man on the way to her room); Fenster v. Leary,
20 N.Y.2d 309, 229 N.E.2d 426, 202 N.Y.S.2d 739 (1967) (holding New York vagrancy statute
unconstitutional); Fonte v. State, 213 Tenn. 204, 373 S.W.2d 445 (1963)(arrest for vagrancy upheld
where defendant possessed large sum of money gained in gambling activities); State v. Grenz, 26
Wash. 2d 764, 175 P.2d 633 (1946), appealdismissed. 332 U.S. 748 (1947)(chicken thief arrested for
vagrancy as he was about to enter a chicken yard); Douglas, Vagrancy and Arrest on Suspicion, 70
YALE L.J. 1 (1960); Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and its Administration, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 603
(1956).
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the individual as to be unreasonable under the fourth amendment. 7 In
fact the Court, via Davis v. Mississippi' decided in the next term,
suggests that a statute authorizing a two hour detention absent probable
cause may well be unconstitutional. In Davis, petitioner and twenty-four
other Negro youths were held for questioning and fingerprinting in
connection with a rape. The only leads available to the police were a set
of fingerprints and a general description of the assailant. Suspects had
been "chosen" in random fashion by means of dragnet procedures. The
Court held that petitioner's fingerprints should have been excluded in his
trial as fruits of an illegal seizure in violation of his fourth amendment
rights. Consequently, if the Davis principles are applicable to
justifications for detention besides fingerprinting, a two-hour detention
for questioning and investigation ordered at a police officer's discretion
seems highly unlikely to be within the range of circumscribed procedures
permitted by the Court.
In Morales v. New York, 89 however, which was decided after Davis,
the Court skirted the issue. The state court had sanctioned the police in
detaining an individual "for custodial questioning on less than probable
cause." The Supreme Court observed that the holding below went
beyond Terry and Sibron, but avoided consideration on the merits by
remanding the case for further factual elucidation.10
III.

BRIEF DETENTIONS WITHOUT SHOWING OF SUSPICION

Roadblocks are a common phenomenon in the United States.
Courts have upheld their use to control the passage of people and goods
across international borders,9" to apprehend fleeing felons, 92 to check
87. If it is decided that a two hour detention on suspicion is not "unreasonable," where is the
line to be drawn? Is the New Hampshire variation of four hours also reasonable? If so, would six
hours be reasonable? In any event, it would seem clear that whenever the detention is prolonged,
and the police engage in the interrogation of the suspect, the Miranda warnings are essential. See
Raphael, supra note 67, at 343. The dangers of station house detention for interrogation are also
discussed by Justice Frankfurter in Colombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961).
88. 394 U.S. 721 (1969).
89. 396 U.S. 102 (1969).
90. Given an opportunity to develop in an evidentiary hearing the circumstances leading to
the detention of Morales and his confessions, the State may be able to show that there was
probable cause for an arrest or that Morales' confrontation with the police was voluntarily
undertaken by him or that the confessions were not the product of illegal detention.
Id. at 105. See also Doran v. United States, 421 F.2d 865 (9th Cir. 1970); People v. Hatcher, 2 Cal.
App. 3d 71, 82 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1969).
91. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); Chavez-Martinez v. United States, 407 F.2d
535 (9th Cir. 1969); Marsh v. United States, 344 F.2d 317 (5th Cir. 1965); Fernandez v. United
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driver's licenses and vehicle registration papers,93 to inspect vehicles,94
and, less frequently, to uncover unknown violations of the law.9 Certain
characteristics common to all roadblocks may be observed. First, they
involve some degree of detention of the occupants of a vehicle. Second,
the persons detained do not realistically have any choice in stopping or
not stopping.9 Third, these detentions and the frequent searches incident
thereto are conducted without the authority of a warrant. Finally, with
the exception of an infinitesimally small number of cases, there is no
probable cause, as commonly understood, to stop any particular vehicle.
In sum, the aggregate of the conditions inherent in roadblocks suggests a
serious constitutional challenge to their legality.
Indeed, the roadblock detention goes further than the stop-and-frisk
or field interrogation situation, for there is not even the presence of
suspicion upon which the law enforcement officer's action can be
founded. Rather, the roadblock, aside from its use to apprehend fleeing
felons, operates on the principle of the law of averages: out of any
number of vehicles which are detained, a certain percentage of violations
of some law should be discovered. 9 7 The constitutionality of such
States, 321 F.2d 283 (9th Cir. 1963); Ramirez v. United States, 263 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1959); King
v. United States, 258 F.2d 754 (5th Cir. 1958); Landau v. United States Atty., 82 F.2d 285 (2d
Cir. 1936); United States v. Berard, 281 F. Supp. 329 (D. Mass. 1963); United States v. Yee Negee
How, 105 F. Supp. 517 (N.D. Cal. 1952); People v. Mitchell, 209 Cal. App. 2d 312, 26 Cal. Rptr. 89
(1962); Ramirez v. State, 123 Tex. Crim. 89, 58 S.W.2d 829 (1933).
92. People v. King, 175 Cal. App. 2d 386, 346 P.2d 235 (1959); Commonwealth v. Bollinger,
198 Ky. 646, 249 S.W. 786 (1923); Williams v. State, 226 Md. 614, 174 A.2d 719 (1961), cert.
denied, 369 U.S. 855 (1962); State v. Hatfield, 112 W. Va. 424, 164 S.E. 518 (1932); Kagel v.
Brugger, 19 Wis. 2d 1, 119 N.W.2d 394 (1963).
93. Lipton v. United States, 348 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1965); State v. Smolen, 4 Conn. Cir. 385,
232 A.2d 339 (1967); Mincy v. District of Columbia, 218 A.2d 507 (D.C. Ct. App. 1966); City of
Miami v. Aronovitz, 114 So.2d 784 (Fla. 1959); Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 355 S.W.2d 686 (Ky.
1962); Morgan v. Town of Heidelberg, 246 Miss. 481, 150 So. 2d 512 (1963); State v. Severance,
108 N.H. 404, 237 A.2d 683 (1968); State v. Kabayama, 98 N.J. Super. 85, 236 A.2d 164 (Super.
Ct. 1967); Edwards v. State, 319 P.2d 1021 (Okla. 1957)(dictum); State v. Williams, 237 S.C. 252,
116 S.E.2d 858 (1960); Pruitt v. State, 389 S.W.2d 475 (Tex. 1965).
94. Myricks v. United States, 370 F.2d 901 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1015
(1967); People v. De La Torre, 257 Cal. App. 2d 182, 64 Cal. Rptr. 804 (1967); State v. Smolen, 4
Conn. Cir. 385, 232 A.2d 339 (1967); Commonwealth v. Abell, 275 Ky. 802, 122 S.W.2d 757
(1939); People v. Fidler, 280 App. Div. 698, 117 N.Y.S.2d 313 (1952).
95. Wirin v. Horrall, 85 Cal. App. 2d 470, 193 P.2d 470 (1948); People v. Gale, 45 Cal. 2d
253, 294 P.2d 13 (1956); State ex rel. L.B., 99 N.J. Super. 589, 240 A.2d 709 (Juv. &Dom. Rel. Ct.
1968).
96. Presuming the roadblock is a legitimate activity, the failure to stop would amount to a
refusal to obey the lawful command of an officer, a crime in itself.
97. Foote, supra note 5, at 406; Note, Roadblocks and the Law of Arrest in Montana, 24
MoNT. L. REV. 137, 138 (1963).
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procedures, as previously noted, is clearly open to question.98 In 1925, in
Carroll v. United States," the Supreme Court made the following
statement which has been generally ignored:
It would be intolerable and unreasonable if a prohibition agent were
authorized to stop every automobile on the chance of finding liquor and
thus subject all persons lawfully using the highways to the inconvenience
and indignity of such a search. Travellers may be so stopped in crossing an
international boundary because of national self protection reasonably
requiring one entering the country to identify himself as entitled to come
in, and his belongings as effects which may be lawfully brought in. But
those lawfully within the country, entitled to use the public highways, have
a right to free passage without interruption or search unless there is known
to a competent official authorized to search, probable cause for believing
that their vehicles are carrying contraband or illegal merchandise.1"0
This reasoning was reaffirmed in Brinegar v. United States'01 in 1949:
"This does not mean, as seems to be assumed, that every traveler along
the public highways may be stopped and searched at the officers' whim,
102
caprice or mere suspicion."
The Carroll decision, although not involving a roadblock itself,
indicates that the reasonableness of a roadblock will depend upon the
purpose for which it is used. One situation in which this method of
detention is acknowledged as constitutional is in the identification of
98. See generally Reich, supra note 53.
99. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).

100. Id. at 153-54.
101. 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
102. Id. at 177. But see id. at 182-83, 188 (Jackson, J., dissenting):
Undoubtedly the automobile presents peculiar problems for enforcement agencies, is
frequently a facility for the perpetration of crime and an aid in the escape of criminals. But if
we are to make judicial exceptions to the Fourth Amendment for these reasons, it seems to
me they should depend somewhat upon the gravity of the offense. If we assume, for example,
that a child is kidnapped and the officers throw a roadblock about the neighborhood and
search every outgoing car, it would be a drastic and undiscriminating use of the search. The
officers might be unable to show probable cause for searching any particular car. However, I
should candidly strive hard to sustain such an action, executed fairly and in good faith,
because it might be reasonable to subject travelers to that indignity if it was the only way to
save a threatened life and detect a vicious crime. But I should not strain to sustain such a
roadblock and universal search to salvage a few bottles of bourbon and catch a bootlegger.
I do not, of course, contend that officials may never stop a car on the highway without
the halting being considered an arrest or a search. Regulations of traffic, identifications
where proper, traffic census, quarantine regulations, and many other causes give occasion to
stop cars in circumstances which do not imply arrest or charge of crime.
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persons and goods crossing an international border. 103 This practice is
justified as necessary for "national self-protection" 104 and thus is clearly
1
distinguishable from other instances of arrest, search, and seizure. '
Border detentions have even been upheld where they occurred some
distance from the international line.1"' Moreover, searches are also
known to occur on state boundaries for the purpose of detecting the
illegal or untaxed importation of liquor, tobacco products, diseased
validity of such procedures
plants and animals, and other items. The
10 7
tested.
judicially
been
have
to
appears not
There are no Supreme Court decisions concerning the
08
constitutionality of a roadblock used to apprehend a fleeing felon. But
the practice has been uniformly upheld by those state courts which have
considered the issue.' If the roadblock is legal, then any violations of
the law incidentally detected through its use may be the subject of
prosecution. 110
Language employed by the Court in both Carroll and Brinegar
suggests that roadblocks used to check driver's licenses or vehicle
103. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132
(1925); cases cited note 91 supra.
104. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925); see note 100 supra and
accompanying text. See also King v. United States, 258 F.2d 754, 756 (5th Cir. 1958).
105. The search for and seizure of. . . goods liable to duties and concealed to avoid the
payment thereof, are totally different things from a search for and seizure of a man's private
books and papers for the purpose of obtaining information therein contained, or of using
them as evidence against him. The two things differ toto coelo. In the one case, the
government is entitled to the possession of the property; in the other it is not.
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623 (1886). See also Landau v. United States Atty., 82 F.2d
285, 286 (2d Cir. 1936); United States v. Yee Negee How, 105 F. Supp. 517 (N.D. Cal. 1952).
106. Fernandez v. United States, 321 F.2d 283 (9th Cir. 1963).
The right of border search is indeed broad, and the border itself is elastic. Judged by Texas
standards, sixty-three miles is a small distance, and if the Customs agents had any reason,
even though not ordinarily measuring up to "probable cause," it might, under all the
circumstances suffice to meet the constitutional test of reasonableness and amount to
"probable cause."
Marsh v. United States, 344 F.2d 317, 324 (5th Cir. 1965). But see Contreras v. United States, 291
F.2d 63 (9th Cir. 1961); Moring v. United States, 40 F.2d 267 (5th Cir. 1930).
107. See Note, Random Road Blocks and the Law of Search and Seizure, 46 IOWA L. REV.
802, 810-11 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Random Road Blocks].
108. But see Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 182-83, 188 (1949) (Jackson J.,
dissenting). See note 102 supra.
109. See cases cited note 92 supra. "This is a necessary and reasonable restraint for
protection of our personal liberty." State v. Hatfield, 112 W. Va. 424, 426-27, 164 S.E. 518, 519
(1932). "Such authority is inherent in the power and the duties of law-enforcement officers if those
duties are to be effectively discharged." Kagel v. Brugger, 19 Wis. 2d 1, 4, 119 N.W.2d 394, 396
(1963).
110. People v. King, 175 Cal. App. 2d 370, 346 P.2d 235 (1959).
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registrations are impermissible."' However, neither of these cases has
ever been relied upon by a court to prohibit such practices by law
enforcement officers. Courts have said that such momentary detentions
do not constitute arrests,1 2 that such procedures are necessary to enforce
the licensing and registration laws," 3 that the interests of the individual
must be balanced against those of the public,"1 that no unreasonable
infringement of the right of privacy is involved," 5 and further, that the
practice protects automobile owners against the unauthorized use of
their vehicles. " Many of the same reasons expressed to uphold the use of
roadblocks have been advanced to secure the right to conduct safety
inspections of vehicles." 7 Only where the roadblock is being used as a
subterfuge to conduct searches for other purposes do the courts find the
practice offensive."18
Ill. "[T]hose lawfully within the country, entitled to use the public highways, have a right to
free passage without interruption or search unless there is known to a competent official authorized
to search, probable cause for believing that their vehicles are carrying contraband or illegal
merchandise." Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1949); cf Brinegar v. United States,
338 U.S. 160, 182-83 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). See also Patenotte v. United States, 266 F.2d
647 (5th Cir. 1959), quoting Justice Jackson with approval.
112. Mincy v. District of Columbia, 218 A.2d 507 (D.C. Ct. App. 1966); Commonwealth v.
Mitchell, 355 S.W.2d 686 (Ky. 1962); Morgan v. Town of Heidelberg, 246 Miss. 481, 150 So. 2d
512 (1963); Pruitt v. State, 389 S.W.2d 475 (Tex. Crim. App. 1965).
113. Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 355 S.W.2d 686 (Ky. 1962); State v. Kabayama, 98 N.J.
Super. 85, 236 A.2d 164 (Super. Ct. 1967); State v. Severance, 108 N.H. 404, 237 A.2d 683 (1968).
114. City of Miami v. Aronovitz, 114 So. 2d 784 (Fla. 1959). This case directly confronted
the court with the issue. Plaintiff had been stopped for a license check at a roadblock, had shown the
officer a valid license, and had continued on his way without being cited for any violation. He thereafter sought to enjoin the city from using roadblocks for this purpose, claiming they were an unconstitutional invasion of his right to use the public ways. The court upheld the power of the city, citing
Carroll,but not discussing the constitutional issue to any extent. Policy reasons concerning growing
highway deaths, among other things, were raised. See also Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 355 S.W.2d
686 (Ky. 1962); State v. Kabayama, 98 N.J. Super. 85, 236 A.2d 164 (Super. Ct. 1967); State v.
Severance, 108 N.H. 404, 237 A.2d 683 (1968).
115. State v. Kabayama, 98 N.J. Super. 85, 236 A.2d 164 (Super. Ct. 1967).
116. State v. Hatfield, 112 W. Va. 424, 164 S.E. 518 (1932).
117. See cases cited note 94 supra.
The State can practice preventive therapy by reasonable road checks to ascertain whether
man and machine meet the legislative determination of fitness. That this requires a
momentary stopping of the traveling citizen is not fatal. Nor is it because the inspection may
produce the irrefutable proof that the law has just been violated. The purpose of the check is
to determine the present, not the past: is the car, is the driver now fit for further driving? In
the accommodation of society's needs to the basic right of citizens to be free from disruption
of unrestricted travel by police officers stopping cars in hopes of uncovering the evidence of
non-traffic crimes. . . the stopping for road checks is reasonable and therefore acceptable.
Myricks v. United States, 370 F.2d 901,904 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1015 (1967).
118. Bowling v. United States, 350 F.2d 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1965); State v. Smolen, 4 Conn. Cir.
385, 232 A.2d 339 (1967); Mincy v. District of Columbia, 218 A.2d 507 (D.C. Ct. App. 1966); State
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The use of roadblocks as a method of generally uncovering crime
would appear to be the least likely to survive constitutional challenge. In
effect, this practice bypasses the constitutional requirement of probable
cause in the accomplishment of arrests and searches. For example,
roadblocks have been used on occasion to blockade certain areas of a
city, so that all persons entering or leaving the area could be detained
and searched for weapons or contraband."' This practice has also been
used purely for harrassment 20 It would seem clear that these practices
fall within the prohibition of the fourth amendment and should no longer
2
be permitted. '
v. Severance, 108 N.H. 404, 237 A.2d 683 (1968); Murphy v. State, 194 Tenn. 698, 254 S.W.2d 979
(1953); Robertson v. State, 184 Tenn. 277, 198 S.W.2d 633 (1947); Cox v. State, 181 Tenn. 344, 181
S.W.2d 338 (1944) (court expressed skepticism about the true purpose of the license check, as the
roadblock was set up on New Year's Eve night).
119. Wirin v. Horrall, 85 Cal. App. 2d 497, 193 P.2d 470 (1948); State ex rel L.B., 99 N.J.
Super. 589, 240 A.2d 709 (Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. 1968). It is reported that the Philadelphia police
established random roadblocks during Burglary Prevention Week at which automobiles were
stopped and searched to determine whether they carried burglary tools or other contraband in hopes
of apprehending some burglars. The state attorney general expressed the opinion that the procedure
was unconstitutional. See Random Road Blocks, supra note 107, at 811. "Connecticut also uses
roadblocks on holidays to check all drivers for signs of drinking." Reich, supra note 53, at 1166.
Recently. . . the Baltimore Sun gave its "Policeman of the Year" award to the inventor of
the "Battaglia plan." This hardly novel invention was to stop and "check" cars driven by
teenagers at night. The Sun reported that during its first year of operation 157,000 cars were
stopped in this operation, netting "more than 1,000 arrests" for non-traffic offenses.
Foote, supra note 5, at 406. State police in Massachusetts stopped 400 motorists in an effort to catch
residents who were buying their holiday cheer at cut rate New Hampshire prices and bagged
one violator, described as "an elderly, bewildered man." A five hour roadblock on
Chicago's south side is reported to have involved stopping 1,190 cars, with a net catch of
seven persons arrested for narcotics investigation, five suspected drunken drivers and six
drivers who did not have licenses in their possession.
Id.
120. In People v. Gale, 46 Cal. 2d 253, 294 P.2d 13, 15 (1956), deputy sheriffs "were
conducting a routine search of vehicles. . . . 'to curb the juvenile problem and also check for, well,
anything that we [the deputy sheriffs] might find, anything that looked suspicious.' "
Connecticut police have regularly placed roadblocks to stop teenage drivers to see if they
have been drinking in New York State, where the minimum age is lower.
The tendency to institutionalize is part of the normal urge to push any principle to its
logical conclusion. In New Jersey, it was reported that police had used their power to stop
and question in order to aid an effort to lobby for new legislation. According to the New
York Times northern New Jersey police stopped at least 2,400 cars in roadblocks at night for
the purpose of "seeking information to present to the New York Legislature in an effort to
persuade it to raise the drinking age limit from 18 to 21."
Reich, supra note 53, at 1166, 1167. See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 14 (1968).
121. See Wirin v. Horral, 85 Cal. App. 2d 497, 193 P.2d 470, 472 (1948). See also Smith v.
United States, 264 F.2d 469 (8th Cir. 1959); People v. Gale, 46 Cal. 2d 253, 294 P.2d 13 (1956).
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A

SHORTCUT TO CONSTITUTIONALITY

Notwithstanding that some of the investigative procedures
considered above, among them roadblocks and suspicion-based
detentions, raise serious constitutional questions, it is conceivable fhat
such methods may be legitimized in light of the rulings of the Supreme
Court in the companion cases of Camarav. Municipal Court2 2 and See
v. City of Seattle.1i3 These cases respectively dealt with the power of
housing inspectors and fire inspectors to carry out area inspections
without search warrants for the purpose of enforcing municipal codes.
The Government contended that to require a showing of probable cause
to permit the inspections would render enforcement of the laws and the
achievement of the desirable goals of protecting the health, safety, and
welfare of the public impossible." 4 The Court responded that such
practical considerations could not be used to create an exception to the
protection of the Constitution: "It is surely anomalous to say that the
individual and his private property are fully protected by the Fourth
Amendment only when the individual is suspected of criminal
behavior. '"la5 Thus, the Court concluded that administrative searches
could not be conducted without a warrant based on probable cause. 2
At first blush the Court seems to be restricting the right of
municipal authorities to inspect dwellings while at the same time
expanding the individual's right to be free from such intrusions: there is
now a requirement for a warrant where before there was none. However,
the Court took a shortcut to constitutionality-and may have
shortchanged the citizen in the process-in that it unequivocally
"[T]he essential freedom of the individual demands that police not be permitted to stop every car
that passes with no other justification than mere inclination or the desire to harass with no
legitimate end in view." United States v. Bonanno, 180 F. Supp. 71, 80 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). But cf.
State ex rel. L.B., 99 N.J. Super, 589, -, 240 A.2d 709, 719 (Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. 1968):
Under the facts here presented there should be no need for this Court to go into a
lengthy discussion as to what is and what is not reasonable under varying facts and
situations. Here the juvenile was leaving a restricted area of Plainfield troubled by a then
existing civil disturbance at an hour in the early morning when no juvenile should be on the
streets. In view of the looting, reported shootings and in consideration of the marked ability
of an automobile for carrying away contraband, it would seem to be unquestionably reasonable for the officer to stop the vehicle, order the juvenile out of the car and take him into
custody without process.
122. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
123. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
124. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 533 (1967).
125. Id. at 530.
126. Id. at 540; accord,See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 545-46 (1967).
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concluded that the standard of probable cause to issue a warrant for
inspection of a dwelling is not so demanding as that required in the case
of a warrant issued for arrest or seizure pursuant to a criminal
investigation. 12 In response to the contention that varying the standard
of probable cause from that used in criminal cases will lessen the overall
protection of the individual available through the fourth amendment,
the Court asserted:
The warrant procedure is designed to guarantee that a decision to search
private property is justified by a reasonable governmental interest. But
reasonableness is still the ultimate standard. If a valid public interest
justifies the intrusion contemplated, then there is probable cause to issue a
suitably restricted search warrant. . . . Such an approach [does not
endanger] time honored doctrines applicable to criminal investigations
. * [but] merely gives full recognition to the competing public and
private interests .... 12
Therefore, the reasonableness of the public interest is a justifying
principle for lowering the standards of probable cause in order to meet
the fourth amendment mandate.
The policy arguments favoring the inspections in Camara and See
are analogous to those heard in defense of roadblocks to check driver's2
licenses, automobile registration documents, and safety inspections.1 '
Many roadblocks, perhaps otherwise illegal, could be transmuted into
acceptable law enforcement methods if conducted pursuant to a warrant
based on reasonable legislative and administrative standards. By
superimposing the reasonableness of the public interest upon the need for
roadblocks, the standard for probable cause in detaining cars could be
likewise lowered. This possibility has received added support in Davis v.
Mississippi, discussed previously. 130 Having invalidated petitioner's
conviction, which rested on his being fingerprinted after a broad dragnet
sweep, the Court cited Camara for the proposition that detentioni for
127. 387 U.S. at 534.
128. Id. at 539 (citations omitted).
129. Unlike the search pursuant to a criminal investigation, the inspection programs at
issue here are aimed at securing city-wide compliance with minimum physical standards for
private property. The primary governmental interest at stake is to prevent even the
unintentional development of conditions which are hazardous to public health and safety
S.
.. There is unanimous agreement among those most familiar with this field that the only
effective way to seek universal compliance with the minimum standards required by
municipal codes is through-routine periodic inspections of all structures.
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 535-36 (1967).
130. 394 U.S. 721 (1969). See text accompanying note 88 supra.
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fingerprinting "might, under narrowly defined circumstances, be found
to comply with the Fourth Amendment even though there is no probable
cause in the . . .sense [necessary to justify arrest]."' 31 An analogous
approach could be taken to validate many of the detentions previously
discussed which are presently of dubious constitutionality. Extensions of
Camara to either of these possibilities per the Davis dictum would
certainly be the most expansive use of governmental power ever
permitted under the fourth amendment and would lend credence to
Justice Clark's argument in his dissent in See13 1 that the court is rapidly
moving in the direction of judicial sanction f6r what is little more than a
"paper warrant."
V.

CONCLUSION

The innate flexibility of the fourth amendment has resulted in a
judicial proclivity to mold constitutional standards to satisfy the
practical exigencies of varying problems of law enforcement. If literal
reading of Henry were ever justified, subsequent decisions soon made
clear that the determination of the occurrence of an arrest requires a
more probing factual analysis than merely finding a confrontation
between officer and suspect. While Terry can hardly be said to have
established new doctrine, the psychological impact of its underscoring
the constitutional legitimacy of field detentions with less than probable
cause has been manifested clearly in the attitude of lower courts. Courts
need spend less time cautiously approving the general authority of police
to stop suspected persons and may now take Terry as a point of
departure, applying its rationale to disparate situations.
Such malleability only becomes disturbing when viewed in the
combined light of Davis along with Camara and See. The practical
necessity for certain types of public welfare inspections may easily be
accepted as outweighing the minor infringement of individual freedom
involved. The same may normally be said of the occasional roadblock to
apprehend a fleeing felon. But to the extent the Davis dictum presages
constitutionally valid dragnet-type investigative detentions for the
purpose of comparing identifying characteristics, a serious inroad on
fourth amendment protection is threatened.
131.
132.

Id. at 727.
387 U.S. 541,547-48 (1967).
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